Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/3
30 April 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Second session
Geneva, 27 April - 8 May 1998

INPUT FOR POSSIBLE REVISED CHAIR'S WORKING PAPER

Working paper submitted by Canada

States Party to the NPT, reaffirming their commitment to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the treaty are fully realized, and their decision to strengthen the Review Process to that end agree on the following points:[1]

Chapeau

Reaffirmation of commitment to the preamble and the articles of the Treaty.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process for the Treaty as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

- Reaffirmation of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Reaffirmation that the integrity of the Treaty is essential to international peace and security.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Reaffirmation of the necessity for full compliance with the Treaty.[new text]

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1 Note: 'Paragraph 3' and 'paragraph 4' refer to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Chairman's Working Paper, as contained in Annex II of the Report of the Preparatory Committtee on its first session. (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32, 18 April 1997)

The resolution on the Middle East

- Recognition of the value of universality of the NPT.[new text]

- Recognition of the value of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions and and the value of lessons in achieving them for progress toward university of the NPT.[new text]

- Emphasize the vital importance of all States Parties in the region implementing all obligations under the NPT.[new text]

- Emphasize the importance of renewed progress on the Middle East peace process and recognize that the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) process is a useful forum for the discussion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.[new text]

- Call upon States in the region to place all unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towads enhancing peace and security.[new text]

- Recognize confidence-building measures taken by states in the Middle East could be important steps toward the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone in that region; examples of confidence-building measures include: mutual visits to safeguarded facilities, information sharing, and cooperative technical evaluations of a regional verification regime, regional cooperation on nuclear safety and/or nuclear waste management issues as a step toward the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East.[new text]

- Encourage creation of a laboratory for safeguards purposes in the Middle East as a step toward the creation of a regional verification system.[new text]

(i) Universality

Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome for the eight new accessions to the Treaty since 1995, bring the number of States parties to 186; urgency for all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

(ii) Main Committee I issues

Non-Proliferation

Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

Nuclear Disarmament

The importance of all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with article XIV of that Treaty.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

Reaffirmation of the need for immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

Recognition of the progress in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the START process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament; reaffirmation of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons and of the commitment by all States to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

- Reaffirmation of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Reaffirmation of support for progress made in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the START Process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament.[new text]

- Confirmation by States Parties of their expectation that the START Process as currently defined by the United States of America and the Russian Federation will be pursued energetically and diligently, beginning with the earliest possible ratification and entry-into-force of START II.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Recognition of the importance of progress in measures related to tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed SLCMs, including confidence-building and transparency measures, as called for by the USA and the Russian Federation in the Helsinki "Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces".[paragraph 4: amended]

- Affirmation of the necessity for the current bilateral nuclear-weapon reductions process, as it progresses beyond START II, to be expanded to engage the other three nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Recognition of the desirability of actively pursuing steps towards greater transparency in nuclear weapons and weapon-usable material matters.[new text]

- Reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ends the development of advanced new types of weapons, thereby consisting an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Reaffirmation of the vital importance of all States signing and ratifying the CTBT as soon as possible.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Urging the nuclear-weapon States, as a confidence building measure, to report individually and on a regular basis to the CD and the NPT Prepcom on the steps they have taken toward fulfilling their article VI commitments.[new text]

- Affirmation of support for the proposal in the CD of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more such issues might be negotiated multilaterally.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Recognition of the FMCT obligation in the P&O's document.[new text]

- Affirmation by the nuclear weapon States of a moratorium of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons on other nuclear explosive devices, pending conclusion of an FMCT.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Recognition by the nuclear weapon States that greater transparency of, and continuing steps to reduce, their nuclear weapons usable fissile material stockpiles should be pursued energetically.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Welcoming any steps which could move the FMCT negotiation forward, including the establishment of a committee to discuss technical questions related to an FMCT, including, but not limited to, verification, implementation, and existing stocks.[new text]

- Urging the nuclear weapons States to take further steps to increase transparency of activities related to military stockpiles of fissile materials. We urge the NWS to take the following steps:

  1) increase the amount of military fissile material declared excess, and put this material under permanent safeguards;

2) declare the amount of fissile material dedicated to military (weapon or naval propulsion) use, and the amount declared excess;

3) declare the forms in which military fissile materials are held, and their manner of storage; and

4) provide information about status and location of facilities involved in HEU production and PU separation.[new text]

- Urging the nuclear weapon States to ascertain their total holdings of fissile material for nuclear explosive and naval propulsion purposes.[new text]

- Affirmation that all production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes has ceased, and commitment to declare all facilities related to fissile material production for nuclear weapon purposes.[new text]

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Welcome for the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995 and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned enhances global and regional peace and security.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

Security Assurances

Reaffirmation of the view that further steps, which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument, should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

- Reaffirmation that the provisions of Article V of the Treaty with regard to peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of the CTBT, and in particular of Article VII of that Treaty.[paragraph 4: amended]

(iii) Main Committee II issues

Safeguards

Welcome for the conclusion of negotiations on the IAEA 93+2 programme to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system and expectation that IAEA will endorse that outcome at its special session in May; reaffirmation that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

- Urge every State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which has not already done so to bring into force a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pursuant to Article III of the Treaty. Also urge States not party to the Treaty to enter into comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA.[paragraph 4: amended]

- States strongly support the development and implementation of the Safeguards System so as to strengthen the safeguards regime by improving its effectiveness and efficiency and also strongly support ongoing efforts to meaningfully integrate the new safeguards measures arising from Part 1 of Programme 93+2 and the model Protocol with elements of the existing system.[new text]

- Applaud the May 1997 decision of IAEA Board of Governors to approve the text of the Model Protocol to existing Safeguards Agreements (93+2 Programme, Part II).[new text]

- Urge all states with Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA to conclude as quickly as possible an Addditional Protocol to their respective Safeguards Agreement(s), pursuant to INFCIRC/540.[new text]

- Calls upon the nuclear-weapons States to make arrangements within the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements to place permanently under IAEA safeguards nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Urge all states to adopt the IAEA's recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC-225rev3.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Urge all States parties that are parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials to undertake a review of the Convention at the earliest possible time, with the goal of determining the adequacy of the current regime and extending the Convention if required.[paragraph 4: amended]

Export Controls/Transparency

- Recognition that national nuclear export controls are an essential element of an effective national nuclear non-proliferation regime and are a means for States Parties to seek to ensure that their nuclear exports do not contribute to nuclear proliferation and thereby fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. By so doing, they contribute to a climate of confidence in the trade in nuclear items that encourages and facilitates international nuclear cooperation in pursuit of economic and technological development.[new text]

- Urge transparency in nuclear-related export controls within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among interested States Party to the NPT. The October 7-8, 1997 International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Vienna was a positive step in this regard. Express support for the development of other initiatives aimed at furthering this objective.[new text]

(iv) Main Committee III issues

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Reaffirmation of commitment to continue to take further steps for the full realization of the relevant provisions of the Treaty, taking into account the undertakings in the principles and objectives on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.[paragraph 3: agreed text]

- Recognition that nuclear energy can be a safe, environmentally sound and cost-effective source of energy for those states that choose to include it in their mix of energy sources.[new text]

- Recognition that bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements can be effective instruments for facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.[paragraph 4: amended]

Nuclear Safety

- Recognition of the importance of signing, ratifying and implementing the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Call upon all states to participate actively in the implementation of the Convention. States also look forward to the first meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties in 1999, and the peer review of National Reports, as an essential element of that process.[paragraph 4: amended]

- Recognition of the importance of working actively to implement the provisions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships (the INF Code).[paragraph 4: amended]

- Welcome the adoption by the IAEA of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and call on states to ratify the Convention in the near future.[paragraph 4: amended]

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

- Welcome proposals for the international community, through the IAEA, to review international standards for the physical protection of nuclear material, both during international transit and while under national jurisdiction.[new text]

IAEA Technical Cooperation

- Continued support for the International Atomic Energy Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund and strongly supports broadening the bases of contributors.[new text]

  Support for the technical cooperation efforts undertaken by the IAEA and its Member States and, in particular, support for the new IAEA strategic goal to promote tangible socio-economic impact by contributing directly in a cost-effective manner to the achievement of the major sustainable development objectives of each country.[new text]

  Urges all Member States to contribute to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) as a means of ensuring that resources are available for those IAEA technical cooperation activities financed through the TCF.[new text]